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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimization of a portfolio
consisting of securities. An investor with an initial capital, is interested
in constructing a portfolio of securities. If the prices of securities change,
the investor shall decide on reallocation of the portfolio. At each mo-
ment of time, the prices of securities change and the investor is interested
in constructing a dynamic portfolio of securities. The investor wishes to
maximize the value of his portfolio at the end of time T . We use a novel
theoretical approach based on dynamic programming to solve the age old
problem of dynamic programming. We consider two cases i.e. Determin-
istic and Stochastic to approach the problem and show how the portfolio
is maximized using dynamic programming.
1 Introduction
The problem of portfolio optimization has intrigued many people over the past
few decades. Markowitz in 1952 proposed the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT)
which paved way for a new research area. The essence of Markowitz’s MPT is
that there is a trade-off between risk and returns and individuals can reduce
the risk associated with a single asset by diversifying their portfolios. It aims to
maximize the returns of an portfolio given the risk or to minimize risk for a given
value of expected returns [1]. Over the years there have been many variants to
MPT. Some theories have even tried to analyze this problem by using behavioral
analysis of the investors. The Behavioral Portfolio Theory (BPT) proposed by
Sherfin and Statman in 2000 is a classic example of this [2]. Some of the other
theories like Black-Litterman Model, mean semi-variance optimization have also
been proposed in the recent past. But, none of the above theories conclusively
provides an answer to the ever intriguing problem of portfolio optimization.
The problem of portfolio optimization can be considered as a dynamic process
because the price of securities keep on changing at different time periods. Dy-
namic programming is a handy tool to analyze processes which are dynamic
in nature. Mathematical modeling approach is widely used in different areas of
science and technology. It provides deep insights if try to mathematically model
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various phenomenon related to economics and finance. The basics of the ap-
proaches and methodologies applied here can also be seen in [8-56]. Malafeyev
and Redinskih (2014) mathematically analyze multi-agent corrupt networks us-
ing dynamic modelling. Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev in their book Understanding
Game Theory (2010) and The mathematical Analysis of the Financial Markets
(2010) analyzed the mathematical aspects of financial markets and have delved
upon the problem of portfolio optimization. Grigorieva and Malafeev (2014),
also analyze the many period postman problem with help of dynamic program-
ming. In this paper, we develop a novel theoretical technique based on dynamic
programming to analyze the problem of portfolio optimization.
2 Mathematical description of the model.
Let us divide a finite interval of time [0;T ] into sub-intervals with the help of
discrete points, tk, k = 1, . . . , f : 0 = t1 < t2 < . . . < tf = T . At these discrete
points, lk types of securities are issued, where jk = 1, . . . , lk.
Let us define some important parameters related to constructing a dynamic
portfolio.
1) τjk — is the time of maturity of securities of type jk, i.e., the interval [tk; tk+
τjk ]. tk + τjk ≤ T , is the period during which securities of the type jk are in
circulation in the market.
2) µjk(t) — is defined as the quotation of securities of type jk at time t, i.e., its
market value.
3) pjk(t) — is defined as the fee for the purchase and sale of securities of type
jk at time t, for any jk = 1, . . . , lk, k = 1, . . . , f .
Securities of type j1 are issued at time t1, where j1 = 1, . . . , l1. An investor
decides whether or not to purchase securities of this type, at an initial state S0,
s(t1) =
l1∑
j1=1
sj1(t1), (1)
where sj1(t1) — is the amount which is used by the investor to buy securities
type j1,j1 = 1, . . . , l1.
The prices of securities of type j1 = 1, . . . , l1, at time t1 are µj1(t1) and the
investor purchases hj1(t1) number of securities of this type,
hj1(t1) =
sj1(t1)
µj1(t1)
.
The value of s(t1) must satisfy the following condition:
s(t1) +
l1∑
j1=1
pj1(t1) · hj1(t1) ≤ S0, (2)
where pj1(t1) is the fee paid by the investor for the purchase of securities of type
j1 at time t1, j1 = 1, . . . , l1. The available funds that the investor has after the
purchase of securities of type j1, is given by the following equation:
S1 = S0 − s(t1)−
l1∑
j1=1
pj1(t1) · hj1(t1) (3)
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At time t2, the price of securities of type j1, j1 = 1, . . . , l1 would be – µj1(t2).
So the total income of the investor at time t2 can be defined as:
W (t2) = S1 +
l1∑
j1=1
µj1(t2) · hj1(t1). (4)
At time t2, the price of securities of type j2 also changes and this process repeats
itself at each time step. For example, at time t3, the price of securities of type
j3 changes and so on.
Now let us consider the i-th time period [ti, ti+1].
Suppose at time ti (at the beginning of the i-th period), an investor has Si−1
amount of available funds . hjk(ti−1) is defined as the number of securities of
type jk which are owned by the investor at the beginning of the i-th period,
jk = 1, . . . , lk.
W (ti) is the total income of the investor at time ti. W (ti) can be mathematically
expressed using the following equation:
W (ti) = Si−1 +
i−1∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
µjk(ti) · hjk(ti−1). (5)
At time ti, the price of securities of type ji changes and an investor has to
make a decision - whether or not to reallocate his portfolio. s(ti) is the amount
which the investor has at the beginning of ith period. hjk(ti−1) is the number
securities that the investor owns at the beginning of the i-th period and hjk(ti)
is the number of securities which he wants to possess at the end of i-th period
and at the beginning of the (i + 1)th period. The price of securities of type
jk = 1, . . . , lk,k = 1, . . . , i changes in this (tk + τjk ≥ ti) time interval.
We consider the following scenarios:
1) If hjk(ti) − hjk(ti−1) > 0, then the investor decides to re-buy these many
(hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1) number of securities of type jk.
2) If hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1) < 0, then the investor decides to short sell these many
number of (hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1)) securities of type jk.
3) If hjk(ti) − hjk(ti−1) = 0, then the investor does not change the number of
securities of type jk in his portfolio in this period.
4) If hjk(t1) = 0 and k > 1, then there is a security of type jk at time t1 whose
price hasn’t changed yet. Similarly, the securities, whose maturity time has
already passed by ti, (tk + τjk < ti), would be of zero value. These securities
will not be of any use to the investor.
Since we have not taken inflation into account, an investor must try to invest
all his funds in securities.
Thus, the amount that is redistributed in the portfolio during the period [ti, ti+1]
is equal to:
s(ti) =
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
µjk(ti) · (hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1)). (6)
We also have to consider the fee that brokers charge (brokerage) from their
clients for the purchase and sale of the securities.Si is the available amount,
which remains with the investor by the end of the period [ti, ti+1]. This is the
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amount he has at time ti+1. Si is given by the following equation:
Si = Si−1 − s(ti)−
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
pjk(ti)· | hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1) | . (7)
The investor must select s(ti) in such a way that the value of Si be must be
non-negative.
The difference of (hjk(ti) − hjk(ti−1)) is taken over as a small fee, which is
charged during both buying and selling of securities.
If there are n brokerage firms in the securities market, with r = 1, . . . , n, then
the investor chooses the firm which charges minimal commission on the deal for
jk-th type of securities at time ti. The commission charged by brokerage firms
can be mathematically expressed in the following way:
pjk(ti) = min
r
prjk(ti), r = 1, . . . , n, (8)
where prjk(ti) is the commission charged by the r-th brokerage firm, when facil-
itating a deal of security type jk in the time period [ti, ti+1], (jk = 1, . . . , lk).
The total income of the investor at time T − 1 equals:
W (tT−1) = ST−2 +
T−2∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
µjk(tT−1) · hjk(tT−2). (9)
If the investor decides to sell all existing securities at time T−1 then the amount
by which the investor reallocates his portfolio during the period [T−1, T ], equals:
s(tT−1) = −
T−2∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
µjk(tT−1) · hjk(tT−2), (10)
The amount which the investor has at the end of [T − 1, T ] period equals:
ST−1 = ST−2 − s(tT−1)−
T−2∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
pjk(tT−1) · hjk(tT−2). (11)
Thus, the total income of the investor at time T is equal to the income of the
investor at the end of the period [T − 1, T ]. This income equals:
W (tT ) = ST−1. (12)
The investor should try to maximize this value by carefully and dynamically
changing his portfolio throughout the period [0, T ]. This can be achieved by
changing the amount allocated to different types of securities in the portfolio.
3 Description of the problem in terms of dy-
namic programming.
3.1 Deterministic case.
We will use dynamic programming as a method of optimization.
Let us consider the case, when there is no uncertainty, i.e., all the tasks men-
tioned in the previous section are precisely defined.
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An investor decides to re-balance his portfolio at discrete time points ti, i =
1, . . . , f − 1. This process can be divided into f − 1 stages ( as there are f − 1
discrete points, when the portfolio needs to be re-balanced ). At time ti, the
prices of li securities of type ji = 1, . . . , li are changed, and each ji-th security
has a maturity time, τji . Thus, at every i-th step, this process can be divided
into as many number of steps as the number of times the price of securities
changes at time ti. Thus, the intrinsic properties of the process of reallocation
of funds in the portfolio allow to consider it as a multi-step process. This can
be mathematically expressed as follows:
(f − 1)(
f−1∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
ljk)
At each mi-th step,we take those securities whose prices change at time
ti and the investor needs to change his portfolio. The amount by which the
portfolio changes equals:
smi(ti) = µmi(ti)(hmi(ti)− hmi(ti−1)), (13)
mi = 1, . . . ,
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
ljk . (14)
Here, the variable smi(ti) can be considered as a control variable.
We consider the initial amount of the investor’s funds, as the initial state of the
system S0. The value S0, S1, . . . , Sf−1, is the balance amount which remains
with the investor, after he has reallocated his portfolio in the previous steps.
We will consider these values as state parameters.
The relation (5) that describes the total income of the investor for i steps is the
efficiency index of i-th step (It is our objective function).
The efficiency of the whole process is described as the income received by the
investor within T periods. It can be expressed as (12):
W (tT ) = ST−1 ,
the value of ST−1 is given by equations (10) and (11):
s(tT−1) = −
T−2∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
µjk(tT−1) · hjk(tT−2),
ST−1 = ST−2 − s(tT−1)−
T−2∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
pjk(tT−1) · hjk(tT−2).
The state of the system described by the relations (6) and (7) can be expressed
as:
s(ti) =
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
µjk(ti) · (hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1)),
Si = Si−1 − s(ti)−
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
pjk(ti)· | hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1) | .
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We introduce the function R(ti, Si−1), which denotes the income received by an
investor for the first i steps under an optimal policy. The function R(ti, Si−1)
is defined in such a way,that i = 2, . . . , f must satisfy functional equations
of the form described below:
R(ti, Si−1) = max
smi (ti)∈Di
{R(ti−1, Si−2) + ∆W (ti)}, (15)
where
∆W (ti) = W (ti)−W (ti−1) − (16)
W (ti) = Si−1 +
i−1∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
µjk(ti) · hjk(ti−1)
How the income of an investor grows over a period [ti−1, ti] is subject to certain
conditions. Di is the set of admissible controls in this step, which is determined
from the constraints in the problem. These controls can be mathematically
expressed as follows: Di:
0 ≤
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
sjk(ti) +
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
pjk(ti)· | hjk(ti)− hjk(ti−1) |≤ Si−1. (17)
When i = 1 we get
R(t1, S0) = S0 . (18)
Equations (15) and (18) are the main functional equations of dynamic program-
ming.
Let us assume that at the beginning, the total income of the investor is given
by:
W (t1) = S0.
Therefore, from (15) and (18), the function R(ti) for i = 2, . . . , f takes the
following form:
R(ti) = max
smi (ti)∈Di
W (ti). (19)
If we know the value of initial capital, we can apply the method of dynamic
programming to obtain the following sequence of functions:
{R(ti, Si−1)} is the function corresponding to maximum income, i = 2, . . . , f ,
and the corresponding vector functions {(s∗mi(ti))} are the optimal controls at
each step i = 1, . . . , f − 1.
3.2 Stochastic case.
Now, let us consider a stochastic version of the deterministic process described in
the previous section.The same method of using functional equations to optimize
the income is also applied in the stochastic version.
Let us define the prices of securities µjk(t), jk = 1, . . . , lk, k = 1, . . . , f ∀t ∈ [0;T ]
as a discrete probability distribution Θjk(t):
µjk(t) µ
(1)
jk
(t) µ
(2)
jk
(t) . . . µ
(n)
jk
(t)
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Θjk(t) θ
(1)
jk
(t) θ
(2)
jk
(t) . . . θ
(n)
jk
(t) (20)
The number n depends on the number of securities, i.e. n = n(jk).
n∑
r=1
θ
(r)
jk
(t) = 1, (21)
But µjk(ti) is an independent quantity.
In the stochastic case, the system goes from state Si−1 to state Si under the
influence of a vector of optimal controls (s∗mi(ti)) ,wheremi is defined in equation
(14), and i = 1, . . . , f − 1.
Since the value of S0 is constant and is known to the investor in advance,
the equation at time t1 will be unchanged. The functional equations of dynamic
programming in this case, are as follows:
〈R(ti)〉 = max
smi (ti)∈Di
{〈W (ti)〉}, (22)
where 〈W (ti)〉 is the mathematical expectation of the income of investor at time
ti,
〈R(ti)〉 is the mathematical expectation of the income which is received by
the investor for i periods under optimal policy, i = 2, . . . , f .
The prices µjk(ti) of the securities are set by the probability distribution
Θjk(t), jk = 1, . . . , lk, k = 1, . . . , f , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. The recurrence relations (6)–
(8), which describe the decision process of an investor contain a random variable.
It can be expressed in the following form:
〈W (ti)〉 = 〈S(i− 1)〉+
i−1∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
(
n∑
r=1
θ
(r)
jk
(ti)µ
(r)
jk
(ti)
)
· hjk(ti−1), (23)
〈s(ti)〉 =
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
(
n∑
r=1
θ
(r)
jk
(ti)µ
(r)
jk
(ti)
)
·
(
hjk(ti)− hjk(t(i−1))
)
. (24)
It is assumed that a small brokerage fee per transaction, for sale and purchase
of securities also has the same distribution as the price of securities. Hence (7)
takes the following form :
〈Si〉 = 〈Si−1〉 − 〈s(ti)〉 −
i∑
k=1
lk∑
jk=1
(
n∑
r=1
θ
(r)
jk
(ti)p
(r)
jk
(ti)
)
×
× | hjk(ti)− hjk(t(i−1)) | (25)
4 Conclusion
It was shown that dynamic programming is a powerful and effective tool in
analyzing problems related to portfolio optimization. Also, the optimization
problem in the stochastic case is to determine the set of values of control variable.
The mathematical expectation of the target function is optimized on the basis
of these values. This case is slightly peculiar because it is impossible to decide
on the choice of control variable, if the state of the system is not known in the
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first step. It means that before making another decision (in the next step),
we need to use the knowledge of the random values that have been observed
before (in the previous steps). An investor should try to optimize his portfolio
by re-balancing according to the price of the securities for maximum returns.
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